The regulatory framework of trade finance: from BASEL I to BASEL III by BAICU, Claudia
 39
 
THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF TRADE FINANCE:  
FROM BASEL I TO BASEL III 
 
Claudia Gabriela BAICU, Associate Professor Ph.D. 
Spiru Haret University 
Faculty of Marketing and International Affaires 
 
 
Abstract  
The global crisis revealed several weaknesses in the international 
framework of banking regulation. Consequently, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) proposed a package of measures to strengthen 
the resilience of the banking sector. Besides the positive effects they have on 
financial stability, the new regulatory provisions affect the ability of banks to 
provide trade finance. Therefore, the banking industry considers that regulators 
have not taken into account the low-risk profile of activity. Starting from this 
premise, the paper consists of three parts. In the first part, the role and 
objectives of the BCBS are presented; the second part is designed to review the 
most important trade instruments and to underline the tendencies in trade 
finance; finally, the last part highlights the regulation of trade finance under 
the Basel I, Basel II and Basel III regimes, and some unintended consequences 
of the Basel III framework.  
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Introduction 
Under the current conditions of intense competition in the international 
market, trade finance represents a significant tool that contributes to the develop-
ment of international trade.  
Due to evolution of information technology and increased globalization, 
open-account arrangements became more and more important. However, bank-
intermediated trade finance still covers a great part of global trade. Moreover, the 
global financial crisis has strengthened the position of traditional trade finance 
instruments compared to open-account payments.  
But the regulatory measures proposed by the Basel III have some negative 
implications for trade finance, which due to increased costs of capital and liquidity 
has become more onerous for foreign trade companies. At the same time, banks are 
not anymore stimulated to provide trade finance, as long as with the same capital 
cost, they can invest in more risky but more profitable assets. 
In order to avoid these adverse consequences, the International Chamber of 
Commerce in Paris (ICC), the banking industry and the trade community recommend 
a more favourable regulatory treatment of trade finance. Their argument is based 
on the historical low-risk profile of the activity. 
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Literature review 
The international regulatory treatment of trade finance regime was developed 
within the BCBS (1988, 2004 and 2010) under the Basel I, Basel II and recently 
Basel III framework.  
Asmundson and others (2011) highlight the role of bank-intermediated trade 
and the shares of global trade covered by the various forms of trade finance. 
Negruş (2008) and Lewis (1988) cited by Howells and Bain (2008) provide some 
classifications of off-balance sheet operations. 
The provisions regarding regulation of trade finance gave birth in the 
speciality literature to numerous debates. For example, the ICC (2009), the ICC 
Banking Commissions (2009), Auboin (2010) argued that under the internal-ratings 
based system of Basel II, the regulatory treatment of trade finance has worsened. 
Consisting with its role of promoting international trade, the ICC (September 2010, 
2011) has developed several documents that argue for low-risk profile of trade 
finance operations, highlighting the adverse effects that the new regulatory 
framework of Basel III has on trade finance. Finally, the ICC (2011) recommends 
regulators a revision of the proposals on trade finance.   
1. The role and objectives of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (henceforth named the Basel 
Committee or the Committee) was created in 1974 following the triggering of three 
banking crises, which generated consequences at the international level (Herstatt 
Bank crisis, Germany; Franklin National Bank crisis, the U.S. and the British Israel 
Bank subsidiary crisis in London). These crises have revealed that the development 
of international banking and increasing interconnections between banks in different 
countries require international action to coordinate banking regulations. The main 
objective of the Committee is to prevent banking crises with international impact, 
thereby strengthening international financial stability. According to this objective, 
the Committee has developed several documents that form the basis for establishing 
rules of banking regulation and supervision in many countries throughout the world. 
Although initially the Committee was composed of representatives of the 
G10, Luxembourg and Switzerland, the composition of the Committee was later 
expanded with the development of banking globalization, now comprising 27 
members from both developed countries and emerging economies.  
The Committee's work focuses on three main areas. 
(1.1.) The first area is related to the adoption of general principles for the 
supervision of banks' foreign establishments. Essentially, these agreements established 
two fundamental principles: 
− no foreign banking establishment should escape supervision; and  
− the supervision should be adequate. 
In order to fulfill these objectives, the foreign establishments of banks were 
classified into three major groups: branches, subsidiaries and joint ventures or 
consortia. Also, sharing the responsibilities between authorities from the origin 
country and those in the host country has been achieved taking into account the 
following aspects: liquidity, solvency and foreign exchange operations and positions. 
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The documents adopted emphasize the importance of permanent cooperation 
between supervision authorities from the origin countries and those from the host 
countries. At the same time, within the supervision of international banking, one 
can notice the tendency to reinforce the principle of supervision from the origin 
country. Also, an adequate supervision imposes adopting the principle of consolidated 
supervision. According to this principle, the supervisors from the origin country 
must monitor the exposure risk of the banks under their responsibility for all 
operations, no matter the territory where they are located. These principles are 
reflected in the document adopted in May 1983, entitled „Principles for the 
supervision of banks’ foreign establishments”. Improving the rules regarding the 
supervision of banks’ foreign establishments was realized in 1990 (the document 
„Information flows between banking supervisory authorities”), 1992 (the document 
„Minimum Standards for the supervision of international banking groups and their 
cross-border establishments”), 1996 (the document „The supervision of cross-
border banking”). 
(1.2.) The Committee’s second area of interest, and the most important 
achievement, is the establishment of minimum capital requirements for internationally 
active banks. This action was motivated by the fact that, seeking to improve their 
profits, at the beginning of the 1980’s, international banks were engaging in risky 
activities that were not correlated with their capital. Taking into account that the 
level of international credit had risen, and the interdependencies between banks 
situated in different countries were becoming more important, it was recognized 
that the crisis of one bank could affect the stability of the whole international 
banking system. After many consultations that started in the 1980’s, the Basel 
Committee published a document in July 1988 regarding the bank capital 
measurement and the capital standards, entitled “International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards”, which is known in the literature as 
the 1988 Basel Capital Accord, or simply, the Basel I. According to this document, 
banks have to hold capital equal to at least 8% of their risk-weighted assets. 
The limitations of the 1988 Accord, the evolution of international banking, 
the increasing complexity of banking risks and progress in banking risks 
assessment have determined the Basel Committee to bring a series of improve-
ments to the capital adequacy requirements of banks. As a result, in June 2004 the 
final form of a new accord was published: “International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards – a revised framework”, a document known as 
the Basel II.  
Starting from the premises that the stability of the financial system can be 
ensured through the coordinated action of three elements – efficient risk manage-
ment, activity of the supervision authorities and the transparency of information 
regarding the bank activity -, the Basel II Accord is based on three pillars:  
− minimum capital requirements;  
− a prudent supervisory review process;  
− market discipline.  
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In accordance with Basel II, the basic principles regarding the calculation of 
the minimum capital requirements, as well as the definition of capital, remain the 
same as in the previous version. However, the calculation methodology of risk 
exposure has been radically modified. Moreover, operational risk was introduced 
when calculating the capital adequacy ratio. To measure risk, banks may choose 
between two options: a standardized approach, similar to the Basel I methodology, 
and an internal rating approach, approved in advance by national supervisors. This 
method allows assessment of the risks in a diversified manner, enabling better 
correlation of minimum capital requirements with risks taken.  
More recently, the global financial crisis has risen for the regulatory and 
supervisory authorities around the world a series of concerns on regulatory 
framework of financial and banking activity. The main limitations of the Basel II 
Accord that were revealed in the context of the crisis, which began in 2007, are1: 
– the minimum Tier 1 capital requirement ratio to risk-weighted assets of 4% 
was inadequate to absorb the credit losses (Tier 1 capital is core capital); 
– the ratings agencies that had the responsibility to assign risk-weighting of 
banks’ assets proved to be vulnerable to potential conflicts of interest; 
– the capital requirements are pro-cyclical; 
– the Basel II Accord stimulated the process of securitization, which in turn, 
enabled banks to reduce their capital requirements and increase their leverage.  
Besides, the Basel II Accord did not give attention to liquidity, and therefore, 
many banks did not hold sufficient liquidity buffers. 
Consistent with its mission, the Basel Committee has developed a set of 
measures for reforming the banking regulation, known as the Basel III framework. 
The main reform measures comprised in these documents have in view: 
– raising the quality, consistency and transparency of the capital base;  
– better risk capture (especially the risks concerning the capital markets 
activities); 
– the introduction of a leverage ratio;  
– the introduction of measures meant to build up capital buffers during good 
times, which are to be drawn from in periods of stress;  
– the introduction of a global minimum liquidity standard for internationally 
active banks.  
According to the provisions established by the Basel Committee, these stan-
dards will be gradually introduced, over a long period of time until the year 2018. 
(1.3.) The third major contribution of the Basel Committee was a set of 
principles, considered to be fundamental to ensure an efficient banking supervision. 
The document which includes these standards, called „Core Principles for Effective 
Banking Supervision”, was published in 1997, following a close cooperation with 
authorities from outside the member states of the Committee. The document was 
revised in 2006. 
                                                 
1
 Fabiani, Riccardo, The Business Impact of “Basel III”, A D & B Special Report, 
October 2010. 
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2. Trade finance instruments. Tendencies in trade finance 
In the specialty literature, there is no consensus on the definition of trade 
finance. According to the ICC2, trade finance refers to short-term sources of 
financing aimed to fill the time-lag between the production of goods and the receipt 
of payment. By supplying trade finance, banks contribute to the expansion of 
international trade.  
Trade finance covers several payment arrangements between importers and 
exporters: open account payments, cash-in-advance and bank-intermediated trade 
finance. These payments vary from arrangements strictly between importers and 
exporters (open account, cash-in-advance) to insurance services, to credit from 
banks (bank-intermediated trade finance). Bank-intermediated trade finance allows 
exporters and importers to use banking system to: (i) verify delivery of goods; (ii) 
guarantee payment for goods; and (iii) provide liquidity for the transaction. The 
most familiar form of bank-intermediated trade finance is the letter of credit3.  
Unlike domestic trade, a number of issues arise in international trade because 
the importer and the exporter come from different countries, and often, they do not 
know each other very well. In addition, others difficulties are related to the fact that 
in the two countries involved in international trade relations, there may be different 
regulations, customary and local traditions, as well as cultural and language 
differences. International trade transactions also mean taking new risks, including 
currency risk and country risk.  
(2.1.) The traditional way to overcome the lack of trust between the importer 
and the exporter is through the use of letter of credit as a means of settlement. The 
letter of credit is the operation by which a bank undertakes, in accordance with 
instructions received from its importer customer, to make payments to the exporter 
upon the presentation of documents meeting the terms and conditions of the letter 
of credit. A letter of credit provides safety to all parties involved:  
− the exporter is certain that he receives payment provided that he delivers 
the goods and submits shipping documents, in strict compliance with the 
terms and conditions of the letter of credit;  
− the importer is certain that payment is made for a good, which at least 
formally, is in accordance with contractual requirements;  
− the bank that undertakes to pay – the issuing bank – retains a pledge on 
documents, which gives it control over the underlying goods, and 
sometimes, its also guaranteed by a deposit made by the importer.  
In addition to the advantages they present, the letters of credit have a number 
of disadvantages related mainly to the high costs involved and the cumbersome 
procedure to cash. As a result, the dominance of letters of credit in all international 
                                                 
2
 International Chamber of Commerce, Report on Findings of ICC-ADB Register on 
Trade & Finance, Document No. 470/147 (Rev), Paris, 21 September 2010, p. 7. 
3
 Asmundson, Irena, Thomas Dorsey, Armine Khachatryan, Ioana Niculcea, and 
Mika Saito, Trade and trade Finance in the 2008-09 Financial Crisis, IMF Working Paper 
WP/11/16, International Monetary Fund, January 2011, pp. 54-55. 
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payments began to erode over time in favour of open account payments, which are 
more flexible and adapt better to the current conditions of international trade. 
(2.2.) An open account arrangement means that the importer pays the value 
of the goods delivered by the exporter at a specified time from delivery. Usually, 
this term is 30, 60 or 90 days from the date of the transport document. From a 
technical standpoint, open account payments do not raise any problems, being 
characterized by simplicity and low costs. The entire risk of operation is borne by 
the seller, who also provides liquidity in the transaction. Therefore, open account 
arrangements are used in international trade relations based on trust and 
transactions developed over a long period of time. 
The development of open account payments was due to an increased trust 
between importers and exporters, as a result of strengthened traditional trade 
relations between the European Union (EU) and North America, the EU 
enlargement, the intensifying financial globalization process and the increased trust 
between partners in developed countries and partners in less-developed country. 
Last but not least, intense competition in the international market requires exporters 
to show flexibility in choosing the method of payment. Consequently, as the 
importer is able to pay for goods after delivery, open account became an important 
marketing tool used by exporters to maintain customers and promote sales. The 
evolution of information technology also had an important role because it allowed 
the development of fast and safe transfers between different parts of the world. 
However, the global financial crisis has strengthened the position of the letter 
of credit, given the comfort which it offers to both exporters and importers. At the 
same time, during the crisis, open account payments have decreased in importance 
due to increasing risks. 
(2.3.) Cash in advance requires the importer to pay before delivery of the 
good. Unlike open account payments, in this case, all risks are borne by importer, 
who provides the liquidity. Often, payments in advance allow buyers to obtain 
some discounts on the traded goods. 
According to estimations made within the International Monetary Fund by 
Asmundson and others (2011, p. 54), in 2008, the shares of global trade covered by 
the various forms of trade finance were: 
− cash in advance – 19%-22%; 
− bank trade finance – 35% -40%; 
− open account – 38%-45%. 
Another trade finance instrument is a bank guarantee. Conducting 
international trade requires risk-taking by both importers and exporters. To cover 
against these risks, importers and exporters often resort to various techniques, 
among which, bank guarantees are very important. By providing a guarantee, a 
bank makes a commitment to pay on behalf of one of its customers – the importer 
or the exporter – to the guarantee’s beneficiary in case its customer fails to fulfill 
its payment obligations towards the beneficiary.   
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3. The international regulatory framework of trade finance. Adverse 
consequences of the Basel III regime on trade finance 
Many of the trade finance-related activities are circumscribed to traditional 
off-balance sheet items, which are an extension of the bank’s basic operations (e.g., 
opening and confirming letters of credit, issuance of letters of credit stand-by, 
issuance of bank guarantees). Historically, these operations have been performed 
for a long time; for example, the letter of credit was widely used after World War I, 
when unlike previous periods, the share of transactions carried out between 
partners who do not know each other personally increased. 
As a result of tougher competition, disintermediation, development of 
information technology, increasing volatility in financial markets, and a change in 
investment preferences after the 1980s, off-balance sheet operations have acquired 
new dimensions, both quantitative and qualitative. In quantitative terms, the 
volume of these operations has greatly increased and extended to new financial 
markets (first in developed countries and later in other countries), and in terms of 
quality, off-balance sheet operations have been diversified and refined. 
Therefore, off-balance sheet transactions occurring after 1980 are a manifes-
tation of the financial innovation process. One of the most important reasons for 
off-balance sheet growth was the increased competition for deposits and credits, 
which decreased the income from interest. As a result, banks were forced to find 
new solutions to maintain and improve profitability. In this context, they turned 
attention to off-balance operations, which allowed them to obtain fee income. 
Negruş (2008, p. 462) classified off-balance sheet operations into three groups: 
− operations on a commission basis (i.e., sale and purchase of securities);  
− operations on future payment commitments;  
− trade related off-balance sheet transactions (i.e. letters of credit, foreign 
exchange operations). 
Another classification of off-balance sheet operations distinguishes between 
financial services and those giving rise to contingent claims (Lewis, 1988, cited by 
Howells and Bain, 2008, p. 533). The first category includes services such as 
investment advice, portfolio management, insurance broking or credit/debit card 
services. The second category includes guarantees, securities underwriting, hedging 
transaction, etc. 
Initially, regulatory and supervisory authorities did not give due attention to 
risks related to off-balance sheet operations. Until adopting the 1988 Basel Accord, 
an important role in the development of off-balance sheet operations played the 
fact that, under many national regulations, off-balance sheet transactions did not 
involve capital allocation. Later, as the authorities became aware of the risks borne 
by off-balance sheet operations, these were included in the calculation of the 
capital adequacy ratio, by using conversion factors. Use of the conversion factors 
constitutes recognition of the fact that not all balance-sheet operations necessarily 
convert to on-balance sheet exposures.  
(3.1.) According to the Basel I regulations (paragraph 42), all off-balance 
sheet commitments are converted into credit risk equivalents by multiplying the 
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nominal principal amounts by conversion factors, the amounts obtained then being 
weighted according to the nature of the counterparties. 
Short-term engagements such as documentary letters of credit collateralized 
by the underlying shipments received a conversion factor of 20%. The low value of 
this conversion factor was seen as recognition of the fact that a letter of credit 
involves low risk for both the issuing bank and the confirming bank. Other off-
balance sheet trade products, like performance bonds or standby letters of credit, 
received a 50% credit conversion factor. 
(3.2.) Under the standardized approach of the Basel II regime, the regulatory 
treatment of off-balance sheet items in trade finance is similar to the Basel I 
framework. However, under the internal-ratings based system of Basel II, the 
regulatory treatment of trade finance has worsened4: 
− one of the issues raised by banking community was the fact that Basel II 
regime focuses on counterparty risk rather than product or performance 
risks. This approach disadvantages trade finance, which is treated as any 
form of unsecured lending, such as overdrafts;  
− another issue was the rigidity in the maturity cycle applied to short-term 
trade lending. According to Basel II, a one-year maturity floor will be 
applied for all lending facilities. As trade finance lending is generally 
short-term in nature (between 0 and 180 days maturity) and capital 
requirements increase with maturity length, the capital cost of trade 
finance is artificially inflated; 
− finally, a difficulty faced by banks was the lack of historical and per-
formance data to assist in validating risk attributes. 
(3.3.) Starting from the premise that off-balance sheet items are a source of 
potentially significant leverage, the package of measures adopted by the Basel III 
regime establishes that all off-balance sheet transactions are to be included in the 
calculation of the leverage ratio. This measure was taken because in the context of 
global crisis, the securitization process had negative effects on financial stability. 
Initially, securitization was seen as a way to improve financial stability, as it 
allowed spreading the risk over a large number of investors. However, after the 
sub-prime mortgage crisis, securitization was seen as a way to hide the risks, being 
considered one of the factors that triggered the global financial crisis. By 
securitization, banks turn loans into financial instruments (asset-backed securities) 
that move off balance sheet. This practice allowed them to reduce the capital costs 
established by the Basel II rules and also to originate new loans and get additional 
incomes. At the same time, securitization enabled banks to take on growing risks. 
                                                 
4
 International Chamber of Commerce, ICC Banking Commission Recommendations 
on the Impact of Basel II on Trade Finance, Document 470/1119, Paris, 24 March 2009; 
ICC Banking Commission, Rethinking Trade Finance 2009: An ICC Global Survey, 
Document No. 470-1120 TS/WJ, Paris, 31 March 2009; Auboin, Marc, International 
Regulation and Treatment of Trade Finance: What Are the Issues?, Staff Working Paper 
ERSD-2010-09, The World Trade Organization, Geneva, February 2010.  
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In order to calculate the leverage ratio, all off-balance sheet commitments, 
including those related to trade finance, received a uniform 100% credit conversion 
factor. In concrete terms, in contrast to Basel II, the new regulations provide banks 
to set aside five times more capital for letter of credit (from 20% to 100%). In other 
words, letter of credit received the same treatment as "toxic" off-balance sheet 
financial instruments, even if there is no evidence that these exposures have ever 
been used as a source of leverage. The argument used is based on the fact that the 
exposures are supported by transactions involving either movement of goods or the 
provision of services5. 
Considering that the regulatory treatment of trade finance under the Basel III 
framework is not correlated with the low-risk of this activity, the banking 
community, foreign trade companies and other stakeholders have expressed 
concern about the negative unintended effects the new provisions may have on 
international trade. Arguments in favour of low-risk of trade finance exposures are 
the short tenor of transactions and the fact that, unlike other credits, the goods 
underlying the transactions are guarantees for bank.  
In supporting the low-risk profile of trade finance, the ICC conducted an 
analysis that includes data on 5,223,357 transactions provided by nine international 
banks with operations covering a wide range of jurisdictions. Data are provided for 
a period of 5 years (2005-2009) and for five product types: (1) import letters of 
credit, (2) export confirmed letters of credit, (3) guarantees and standby letters of 
credit, (4) import loans and (5) export loans. The findings of this study are: 
− short tenor of trade finance transactions. The average tenor of all products 
is 115 days. Moreover, off-balance sheet products (import letters of credit, 
export confirmed letter of credits, standby letters of credit and guarantees) 
exhibit average tenors of less than 80 days; 
− low defaults across all trade finance transactions considered – i.e. 1,140 
cases out of 5,223,357 transactions. This value is lower for off-balance 
sheet trade products – only 110 cases of defaults from a total of 2,392,257 
transactions; 
− low level of defaults throughout the downturn period – in 2008-2009, only 
445 defaults were reported from a total of more than 2.8 million 
transactions;  
− good recovery rates for all product types; 
− limited credit conversion from of-to on-balance sheet (due to high rates of 
discrepant documentary presentations in case of letters of credit, high rates 
of expiry without payment, and non-payments after default, in case of 
guarantees and letters of credit)6. 
                                                 
5
 Auboin, Marc, International Regulation and Treatment of Trade Finance: What Are 
the Issues?, Staff Working Paper ERSD-2010-09, The World Trade Organization, Geneva, 
February 2010, p. 17.   
6
 International Chamber of Commerce, Report on findings of ICC-ADB Register on 
Trade & Finance, Document No. 470/147 (Rev), Paris, 21 September 2010.   
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One of the most serious consequences of the new regulatory framework for 
trade finance and hence for the development of international trade is the increased 
costs that customers have to pay to obtain such products. According to estimates 
made by the International Chamber of Commerce (2011, p. 66), the new provisions 
adopted by the Basel Committee could lead to an increase in trade finance pricing 
of between 15% and 37%. Consequently, this pricing increase could lead to a 6% 
reduction in the volume of trade finance. Foreign trade companies that rely on 
traditional methods of financing represent the most affected segment; these are 
small and medium enterprises and traders who have partners in developing 
countries, where the letter of credit continues to be used predominantly. As a result 
of the more stringent capital requirements, the banks involved in trade finance 
could adopt several strategies that could range from a reduction in trade finance 
volume to orientation toward riskier activities that, while requiring the same capital 
allocation, could be more profitable. 
Because of these unintended effects on international trade and hence economic 
growth, the ICC recommends regulators a revision of the proposals on trade 
finance, as follows7: 
− use for off-balance sheet trade products of the same conversion factors 
assigned by the Basel II Accord; 
− key risk attributes to be determined on the basis of industry benchmarking 
(since many banks faced difficulties obtaining data to produce validated 
estimates of risk for trade lending). For this purpose, ICC proposes the use 
of the ICC Register;  
− exemption of trade finance products from the one-year maturity floor 
applied to lending facilities.  
 
Conclusions 
The global financial crisis determined the Basel Committee to propose a new 
regulatory framework for banking activity, designed to strengthen financial 
stability. Measures adopted by the regulatory regime Basel III introduce several 
improvements compared to the old regulations.  
However, regulatory measures proposed by the Basel III have some negative 
implications for trade finance. One of the main concerns of the banking community 
is the fact that off-balance sheet trade products received a 100% credit conversion 
factor in calculating the leverage ratio, like all other off-balance sheet operations. 
This treatment does not distinguish between off-balance sheet trade products, 
characterized by low-risk, and other more risky operations. The provision regarding 
the application of a one-year maturity floor for all lending facilities is another 
issue, because banks have to set aside more capital for trade finance lending.   
Under these conditions, banks may choose to restrict their trade finance 
activity in favour of other activities that, while involving the same regulatory cost, 
                                                 
7
 International Chamber of Commerce, Rethinking Trade and Finance: Global 
Survey 2011, ICC Publication no. 710E, Paris, March 2011, pp. 70-71.  
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may lead to higher profits. Because trade finance is particularly important for 
international trade development, restricting trade finance implies negative effects 
on international trade flows. The strongest impact will be felt by commercial 
partners that conduct operations with firms in developing countries because these 
transactions are based on traditional methods of financing, such as letters of credit. 
Small and medium enterprises will be also affected because traditional financing 
instruments support their activities on foreign markets. To avoid an increase in the 
costs of letters of credit, foreign trade companies are encouraged more and more to 
use open account payments. But this practice can lead to increased defaults if the 
counterparty and country risk have not been properly evaluated. In order to avoid 
these adverse consequences, trade finance has to receive a more favourable 
regulatory treatment.  
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